The 6-step programme
The following is by now a tried and tested method for rethinking ideas of peace and conflict. It offers a simple yet effective treatment of the issues, using a set of 6 easyto-follow, step-by-step instructions:
The 6-Step Programme
Step 1 -show how any would-be unified self -be it an individual, a culture, a nation -can only establish and maintain its identity by distinguishing itself from and excluding that which it is not;
Step 2 -demonstrate that any such self cannot be positioned in terms of a simple conflict or oppositional relationship with those identified as being "outside" and "other" to it; for at the same time as it rejects and condemns those others, it also needs them and their difference to establish and maintain its own identity;
Step 3 -reveal that any such self depends upon and even contains many of the attributes it ascribes to its others;
Step 4 -show that it is just another form of what it accuses those others of being;
6
Step 5 -argue that, rather than attempting to "de-other" itself by eliminating whatever its others represent, the prospective self-identical entity needs to recognise that this relation represents an internal dislocation. (In other words, the idea is for it to stop imagining itself as constituting some kind of integral totality while at the same time continually fearing its own immanent dissolution at the hands of its "others");
Step 6 -explain that, rather than representing a crisis or threat, this internally dislocated nature is just what it is: that any would-be unified self just is constitutively non-identical to itself; that this is what makes it possible (and of course impossible) in the first place. Can such an approach be adopted with regard to the situation of the Middle East in order to help us address issues of peace and conflict there? The hypothesis or proposition I want to develop in this essay is that, to a certain extent, this somewhat formulaic-looking method can indeed be useful when dealing with the political complexities of the Middle East -although not in quite so straightforward a manner as the above "6-step programme" may suggest.
But that is for later. At this point I want to move away from broad generalisations as, despite the impression perhaps created by my somewhat playful opening, I do not want to imply that analyses conducted along these "self/other" lines are all the same.
Indeed, this particular project on peace and conflict in the Middle East is driven by an 7 ethical injunction to retain a relation of infinite responsibility to an unconditional hospitality, no matter whether we are dealing with political events or political texts.
ii For this reason I am going to focus in this essay on a specific instance of such an analysis: that provided by the political philosopher Chantal Mouffe -who is one of the most interesting contemporary theorists of the relation between peace and conflict -in her recent books The Democratic Paradox (2000) and, especially, On the Political (2005) .
On the political
In keeping with the approach sketched above, Mouffe views the political in terms of a conflict and antagonism that is irreducible. Reading the philosopher Carl Schmitt against himself, Mouffe argues that the political "'can be understood only in the context of the friend/enemy grouping'" (Schmitt 1976: 35; cited in Mouffe 2005: 11) .
"By showing that every consensus is based on acts of exclusion, [Schmitt] reveals the impossibility of a fully inclusive 'rational' consensus" (Mouffe 2005: 11) . This is because of what Mouffe, following Jacques Derrida, calls the "'constitutive outside,'" whereby, when it comes to the "field of collective identities, we are always dealing with the creation of a 'we' which can exist only by the demarcation of a "they"" (2005: 15) : the ethnic minority, the immigrant, the asylum seeker, the religious or political extremist, the terrorist and so on. From this point of view we can never achieve peace: not internally within a culture or society; nor externally between different cultures and societies. Instead, we need to acknowledge the antagonistic 8 dimension that is "constitutive of 'the political'" (2005: 2) and give up on the fantasy of ever arriving at a completely united and harmonious world in which all power, violence and sovereignty is eradicated. Now, it is important not to see the irreducibility of conflict as a purely negative thing, as it might be perceived, say, by liberal thought, which has as one of its central tenets "the rationalist belief in the availability of a universal consensus based on reason" (11). In fact, far from placing democracy at risk, a certain degree of confrontation constitutes the very possibility of its existence. As far as Mouffe is concerned, "a well functioning democracy calls for a clash of legitimate democratic political positions" (30). It is thus far more dangerous not to acknowledge this irreducible antagonism, as this lack of acknowledgement leads to negative forms of conflict in the arenas of both domestic and international politics. Mouffe explains by referring to the various affective forces, which she calls "'passions:'" i.e. those drives, desires and fantasies which make people want to become part of a crowd, group, community or nation and which form the basis of collective forms of identification. Unless these passions and the forms of conflict they give rise to have a legitimate democratic means of expressing themselves, there is a danger that a "confrontation between essentialist forms of identification or non-negotiable moral values" will take their place, with all the attendant negative consequences (30). For Mouffe, "democratic institutions can contribute to [the] disarming of the libidinal forces leading towards hostility which are always present in human societies" by providing positive channels for their expression (26).
From political to moral
Mouffe's emphasis on the constitutive nature of political conflict leads her to argue strongly against the post-political vision of the world that has been attributed to sociologists such as Ulrich Beck and Anthony Giddens. Revising ideas of the "postindustrial society" and the "end of ideology" from the 1960s, they argue that conceptions of politics built around shared, large-scale group identities have become irretrievably old-fashioned and outmoded. For Beck and Giddens, Western societies are currently experiencing a "'second modernity' in which individuals liberated from collective ties can now dedicate themselves to cultivating a diversity of lifestyles, unhindered by antiquated attachments," such as those associated with the ideological divisions of left and right (1). Liberal democracy has thus won out over communism, and consensus is held as being achievable now through dialogue rather than political conflict and antagonism.
According to Mouffe, however, what we are seeing at the moment is not the "disappearance of the political in its adversarial dimension... What is happening is that nowadays the political is played out in the moral register" (5). So, to provide a few examples of my own, after the events of 9/11, North Korea, Iran and Iraq were notoriously positioned by George W. Bush in terms of an "axis of evil" (Bush 2002 The problem with this moralistic approach, however, is that no dialogue or discussion is possible with anything that is "evil." Evil -as is clearly the case with regard to Osama bin Laden, the Taliban, Saddam Hussein or Palestinian suicide bombers -just has to be condemned and destroyed. Yet not only does this playing out of the political in moral terms often lead those on the side of "good" to be just as violent as those they accuse of being morally wrong, it also results in that which is repressed returning in illegitimate, violent forms, since it has no legitimate outlet.
On the Middle East
Can an analysis such as that offered by Mouffe, and inspired by the philosophy of Jacques Derrida and Carl Schmitt, be adopted with regard to the Middle East, then? If conflict is constitutive of the political, surely one of the most interesting places to think about peace is somewhere in which the irreducibility of antagonism is extremely apparent. From this standpoint, rather than being a "backward region" not worth paying attention to because it is always locked in apparently unresolvable political turmoil -as a 2007 article in Prospect magazine indeed maintained (Luttwak 2007 
On the anti-political
Mouffe's analysis is no doubt useful with regard to some of the issues related to peace and conflict we might want to think about here. In particular, it enables us to understand that conflict in the Middle East is not natural, timeless and without foreseeable end; that the region cannot be positioned as a state of exception, "an included exclusion," the role of which is to "preserve the conceptual and geographical borders, and thus the vitality, of the democratic polis" of the West (Zylinska 2009 ).
The Middle East can only be viewed in this manner if history and politics (and indeed 14 biopolitics) are excluded from our reading of the situation. Instead, with Mouffe, we can see that conflict and antagonism are everywhere constitutive of the political and that they form an irreducible aspect of it. The point then is not to search for the complete resolution of all conflict and the associated reconciliation between the different conflicting parties (as that is impossible); nor to despair at and give up on those who fail to achieve this goal (it is impossible, after all); but rather to find more constructive ways of expressing such antagonism.
Yet, somewhat surprisingly perhaps, adopting an approach of this kind is not what I want to suggest we do: partly for reasons that are specific to Mouffe's analysis; but also for reasons that are applicable to this kind of theoretical approach more widely.
The reasons that are specific to Mouffe concern the way in which her theory, for me,
is not political. I would even go so far as to say it is anti-political.
Antagonism vs. agonism
The anti-political nature of her theory is apparent from her attempt to tame and domesticate the conflict and violence which, following Schmitt, she regards as inherent to the political. For Mouffe, the main question of democratic politics is not how to eliminate issues to do with power and conflict so that we end up in a state of perpetual peace, Kantian or otherwise. The question is rather: how can power and conflict assume a form that is compatible with democratic values? As far as she is concerned, a pluralist democracy can achieve this only through the establishment of a 15 set of institutions and practices by which domination and violence "can be limited and contested" (Mouffe 2000: 22) . To this end Mouffe identifies two different forms in which antagonism can emerge: antagonism and what she calls agonism. "While antagonism is a we/they relation in which the two sides are enemies who do not share any common ground, agonism is a we/they relation where the conflicting parties, although acknowledging that there is no rational solution to their conflict, nevertheless recognize the legitimacy of their opponents. They are "'adversaries' not enemies," she explains (2005: 20) . We can now begin to think the problem of democratic politics somewhat differently, for from the viewpoint of "agonistic pluralism," the goal of democratic politics is to transform antagonism into agonism.
In this way, Mouffe is able to produce an account of society that acknowledges the irreducibility of conflict and violence, but not to such an extent that it destroys any democratic political association.
My concern, however, is that this leads her to offer a consensual vision of society that is almost as free from political conflict as that of the liberals she positions her theory against. For Mouffe is still drawing a line between those with whom "we have a shared adhesion to the ethico-political principles of liberal democracy," and those with whom we do not (2000: 102) ; between those we disagree with, but can nevertheless treat as legitimate opponents and so include within the democratic political association, and those we cannot treat as legitimate and who therefore remain enemies to be excluded.
To argue that Mouffe is adopting the same strategy she criticises others for employing on the grounds that (1) But it is also the case with regard to the understanding of hegemony as a generalised political logic. From this perspective, a society can only institute itself by virtue of its relation to that which exists outside and in excess of it. As a consequence, its identity is constitutively marked by non-closure: it can never achieve absolute unity and stability. It is here that the theory of hegemony understood as a generalised political logic comes into play. For although this instability can never be entirely overcome, which cannot be apprehended through the category of hegemony, it seems. All these different resistances still need to be organised into a "chain of equivalence," with a view to constructing a new hegemony (53).
Mouffe as an anti-political liberal (and not all that pluralistic either)…
The above statement regarding hegemony does not mean I agree with Beck and Giddens that we have entered a "post-political" era; that I consider viewing politics in terms of hegemony to be completely out of date; or that, as far as I am concerned, we are now living in a post-hegemonic world. Again, I am not maintaining that a 22 responsible decision cannot ever be taken to the effect that hegemony is an appropriate concept to use when attempting to understand, analyse and resist a particular situation; nor that we should never attempt to create a chain of equivalence among political struggles. Far from it. I am just drawing attention to the fact that
Mouffe has a transcendentalized and festishized notion of hegemonic politics which is in her own terms universally moralizing and anti-political, as she does not appear to be willing to make an actual political decision about any of this. Not one that remains open both to contestation and to the actual complexities of a given social or cultural situation: to the incalculable, the other, the undecidable, and especially to the possibility that politics may not always appear as she presents it. As a result, I would argue that Mouffe's theory of politics is not political even according to her own criteria. What is more, it is not all that pluralistic either, since she is clearly leaving little room here for political positions that conflict with her own.
In fact the whole thrust of Mouffe's politics is to establish a democratic society that will allow for agonism, but not "antagonism properly speaking."As I explained above, she can only do this, firstly, by distinguishing between antagonism and agonism; and then, secondly, by excluding or marginalizing antagonism -that which she cannot tame or transform into agonism, and which therefore really is conflicting with her own values -outside this (radical) democratic realm. 
… Western, American and bourgeois
This brings me to the more general reasons I want to suggest we do not simply adopt an analysis along these "self/other," "we/they" lines. For, put very briefly, Mouffe's adherence to the 6-step programme I outlined at the beginning of this essay means her political philosophy is all too easily incorporated into those "modernist," "liberal" and "American" ways of thinking Timothy Clark has recently identified as being built into the institution of academic criticism. As Clark shows, the problem with these ways of thinking, for all that they are more or less ubiquitous in literary and cultural theory, is that they tend to be:
a. Reductive -in that they have at their foundation one unacknowledged but "alldetermining norm:" that there is a natural desire for a certain kind of identity, "one whose self-realisation" is aggressive "assertion against others" (Clark 2005: 22) . 24 We can clearly see this in Mouffe and her reliance on the notion of the "'constitutive outside '" (2005: 15) .
b. Insufficiently critical -for example, the assumption that there is a universal drive for unified identity is never interrogated. So while Mouffe may part company with Schmitt on his notion that "there is no place for pluralism inside a democratic political community," and that democracy instead "requires existence of a homogenous demos " (2005: 14) , she nevertheless adheres and leaves unquestioned his notion that political identities consist and emerge out of the we/they relation.
c. Liberal -underpinned as they are by notions of sovereign, unified identity and subjectivity, such apparently "radical" critical projects therefore effectively reiterate the very terms of the bourgeois, liberal, humanist discourse they are attempting to place in question.
Performative media On historical movements, moments, eras, trends and turns
Having said all that, I am not advocating we should now turn our backs on that tradition of thought which has concerned itself with the study of various attempts to establish identity through aggressive self-assertion against others. It is a tradition which, for me, has been, and very much continues to be, incredibly interesting and important. So none of this is about dividing the history of thought into historical movements, moments, trends or turns: from hegemony to post-hegemony; culture to complexity; ideology to affect; representation to flows; or language and textuality to science and materiality. trying to draw attention to with my "6-step" opening), and in the process have been too easily incorporated into uncritical, reductive, liberal and American ways of thinking, closing "off the force of debate and contestation," and severely reducing the complexity that is intrinsic to situations such as that of the Middle East and indeed Europe (Clark 2005: 27) .
Thinking Schmitt against Schmitt, Mouffe against Mouffe
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For instance, it is not hard to understand why Mouffe has to foreclose the decisions I detailed above. If she did not, the antagonistic values she tries to exclude would threaten to bring into question the very concepts of democracy and hegemony she is anxious to defend. Nevertheless, what for me is so interesting about Mouffe's philosophy is how at the same time it also shows us that "bringing a deliberation to a close always results from a decision which excludes other possibilities and for which one should never refuse to bear responsibility by invoking the commands of general rules or principles" (2000: 105) -a state of affairs which would presumably include her own general principles regarding agonistic pluralism, liberal democracy, and hegemony. Instead, such a political decision has to be taken in relation to "specific practices" in "particular contexts " (2005: 121) . It is also one that has to remain open to political conflict and contestation.
From this point of view, the question Mouffe's work pushes us to ask -even if she is not willing or able to raise it herself -is that, if we really want to be political, do we not have to take the risk of remaining open to those who are different, those with whom we do not "have a shared adhesion to the ethico-political principles of liberal democracy," and whom we cannot necessarily treat as legitimate political adversaries? We cannot decide against them always and forever, by invoking general rules or principles in advance:
a. because that would not be to take a decision in an undecidable terrain, and so would not be political;
b. because a specific practice or particular context may arise where we need to take a decision in favour of such different politics and antagonistic "enemies."
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To be sure, doing so might risk challenging many of our own strongly held ideasincluding those of democracy, and of hegemony. But what Mouffe shows -and I am thinking with Mouffe against Mouffe here, just as she thinks Schmitt against Schmitt -is that this is precisely the point. If the political is a decision taken in an undecidable terrain, then it must involve remaining open to the possibility of bringing even our ideas of democracy and hegemony into question.
Creating, inventing, experimenting
What this means is that, in order to be political, we need to be committed to both politics and what I elsewhere call -partly following Mouffe in doing sohyperpolitics (Hall 2008b ). The latter names, for me, a refusal to consider the question of politics as closed or decided in advance, and an associated willingness to open up an unconditional space for thinking about politics and the political beyond the way in which they have been traditionally conceived -a thinking of politics which is more than politics, while still being political. This in turn means not just producing yet another analysis or critique of the politics of others. Of course we have to do this, since without rigorous analysis we risk uncritically repeating the adherence to democracy and hegemony and bourgeois liberal humanism I have identified in
Mouffe, and which can be located in academic criticism more widely. So we can not just shift the balance away from critique and onto "affirmative" methods (Massumi 2002: 17 see that what it means to be political is not something that can, on the basis of either my own philosophy, or that of others, be decided once and for all a priori by means of analysis. Politics is not merely about the kind of intended consequences and affects that can be predicted, foreseen and articulated in advance. Politics is also something that has to be invented and created in relation to specific practices, in particular situations and contexts, by performing the associated decisions, and otherwise doing things that may be unanticipated and unpredictable, and thus beyond analysis.
country x
It is opportunities for doing this -for making affirmative, performative, affective political interventions by using media, both "old" and "new," but especially "new," to create singular situations in which people are required to take responsible political decisions -that I have been experimenting with in recent years in my own work.
Examples include country x, which was a short-lived creative collaboration between the musician Matthew Herbert, Robert Smith and myself. We took our cue for country x from the way in which, by their "nation building" in Afghanistan rather than as a free encyclopaedia).
It is important that we should use digital media in our efforts to think the political otherwise, I think. In his book Imagined Communities ( It is also important that, within this, we should use the wiki medium of communication specifically. For this particular medium enables us to experiment with ideas that are:
• "User-generated" -so everyone with access to the internet and a personal computer will be able to contribute to this "nation" and directly participate in its organisation and running.
• Distributed in structure -its use of "open editing" and "free content" means that this Hyper-Cyprus or WikiNation will have no one point of authorial or editorial control.
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• Not limited by geographical, cultural or national boundaries -instead this WikiNation will have the potential to be inter-and trans-nationally inclusive, even global in scope if we wish.
• Continually in process -identity here will not be a given. It will not be fixed and unified (as if that was ever possible). This "community" or "country" or "collectivity" will rather be a (per)formative practice, something that is created and formed. It will thus be very visibly unstable, fluid, emergent; constantly in the making and in the process of becoming-other.
• Highly responsive -this WikiNation will be able to respond quickly to citizens'/users' demands: for new features, institutions, philosophies and so forth. d. Single, centralised or unified -instead its networked, distributed structure means anyone, anywhere, can potentially join in, publish and participate. It therefore has the capacity to be extremely pluralistic. We could even have a multi-locational, multi-polar institution, community or country, if we wish.
University-generated media
In view of the above I do not want to be prescriptive and establish a set of rules, norms, principles or procedures for any such new community. I do not even want to designate what we should call it. I have provisionally referred to it here as "HyperCyprus" or "WikiNation," but we can think of myriad other names.
x Perhaps we would not want it to assume the conventional form of a nation or country, with all that implies (i.e. that it is confined to a particular national territory, geographical location, social demographic, common identity, history, language, race, ethnicity, religion, ancestry or system of beliefs). That would possibly be too limiting; would involve replicating many features and attributes associated with the "nation" that we might otherwise want to place in question; and would besides risk restricting any such potential community primarily to those with a specific interest in that territory or location and so forth: i.e. Cyprus, the Middle East, Europe, the West. (In the case of Cyprus, in particular, there might also be a danger of it degenerating into the sort of polarised exchanges that have characterised discussions of the "Cyprus problem"
elsewhere on the web.)
One thing that is certain about any such emergent community is that it is not something I can simply tell you about in this essay and show you how it works. It is something that has be invented and created; and by more people than just one single author. However, just to get the experiment started, I have placed in the wiki an initial
proposal -in the form of a mission statement -for a new kind of university that could perhaps be part of any reconceived "nation." (Everyone is free to add to, edit, delete, 35 distribute and mash-up this text however they wish, too.) xi I wanted to begin with a mission statement for the university partly because of the central role the university plays in global capitalism's knowledge economy; xii and partly to show that I am not advocating any kind of libertarianism. (We do need institutions, or even states, which is perhaps another reason for starting from a specific situation and context such as that of Cyprus.) But also because the university is a place where most people who raise questions like those with which I began -and who are therefore likely to read this response on my part -work or study. It therefore seemed to me to be an appropriate place, strategically, to try to begin affirmatively reimagining our ideas of politics and the political -and with them of peace and conflict.
Notes
i For one analysis along these lines, see Hall (2008a) .
ii For more, see Hall (2008b x I am aware that there are already one or two projects in various states of development operating under the latter name on the web. However, they are invariably attempts to reproduce Western, liberal models of democracy, albeit by overcoming perceived problems in its already existing forms.
xi I have also placed an earlier, wikified version of this text in there, subject to the same free content conditions. This is one of the reasons I have given this essay something of the form of a Wikipedia entry, replete with an opening list of contents.
